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In the Supreme O.ourl of the Stale of Utah
ANN GALLEGOS, by and
through her Guardian ad Litem Fidel
Gallegos, and FIDEL GALLEGOS
'
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
vs.
1\HDVALE CITY, a municipal
corporation,
Defendant-Respondent,

Case No.

12312

and
ROBY A. TESTER and NELLIE K.
TESTER,
Defendants.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action to recover for personal injuries
and medical expenses which resulted when the minor
claimant fell against a low metal post and attached
wire fence on the parking area between the sidewalk
and the gutter adjacent to her home. The parties will
be referred to hereinafter as they appeared in the lower
court.
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DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
Summary Judgment was granted in favor of the
defendant, Midvale City.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant Midvale City seeks affirmance of the
summary judgment in its favor.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On the afternoon of July 21, 1966 (R. 1) the minor
plaintiff, then age 2, (Deposition of Carmelita Gallegos,
p. 3) was riding her tricycle along the sidewalk in front
of and adjacent to her home in Midvale, Utah. Her
tricycle somehow came into contact with a short wire
fence and she fell onto the fence and was injured.
The fence, about 9 inches high, onto which she fell,
had been constructed by the co-defendant Roby A. Tester
about a year prior to the accident (Deposition of
Carmelita Gallegos, p. 19) for the purpose of protecting
a new lawn he had planted at that spot from bicycle
riders and pedestrians (Deposition of Roby A. Tester,
pp. 7, 8). The fence was erected at or near the property
line between the Tester and Gallegos residences both
located on the west side of Adams Street. It extended

across the parking area from the east edge of the sidewalk on one side to the gutter on the other side (Exhibits 1 through 4). At least two other similar fences
had been constructed in the same neighborhood (Deposition of Roby A. Tester, pp. 12, 13).
The Gallegos and Tester families both resided on
Adams Street, in a dedicated subdivision of Midvale
City. That street as platted is 50 feet wide from the
private property line of the Gallegos and Tester residences on the ""est to the private property line on the
east (Exhibits l and 2 to deposition of Alton H. SorPnsen, and also page 7; deposition of Roby A. Tester,
p. 23). 'Within the 50-foot street as platted are located
the sidewalks at the east and west property lines, the
paved roadway with curb and gutter at each edge and
the parking strip between the curb and the
on
<>ither side of the roadway (Deposition of Alton H.
Sorensen, pp. 17-19, 25, 29-32).
Following the accident on July 21, 1966 no claim
was filed on behalf of the minor plaintiff until February
2G, 19G7 more than seven months later (R. 9). This
snit was commenced May 8, 1967 (R. 1-4).
A Motion for Summary Judgment, filed on behalf
of dt-fendant Midvale City on July 30, 1970, was granted

by District Judge Sawaya following a hearing and argument on fleptember 18, 1970 (R. 62-63). This appeal
follm,,ed.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE PARKING STRIP LOCATED BETWEEN THE
SIDEWALK AND THE CURBING IS A PART OF
THE "STREET" WITHIN THE MEANING OF SECTIONS 63-30-8, 63-30-13, 10-7-77 and 10-7-78, UTAH
CODE ANNOTATED, 1953 (REPLACEMENT VOLUME).

Plaintiffs contt>nd that the parking strip, upon
whirh the fence and metal posts were located, was not
a part of or inclnded within the "street," "highway"
or "sidwalk" as those tt•rrns are us<>d in Sections 63-30-8,
G3-30-l3, 10-7-77 and 10-7-78, Utah Code Annotated, 1953
(Replac<>ment Yolume). This contention is made in an
t>ffort to avoid the 30-day notice requirement of Section
10-7-77 which otlwnvise would apply. A reading of the
quoted sPC'tiom:, however, shows that such a contention
rnns contrary to both the wording and the obvious purpose of those sections. 'l'hosP sections provide in part
pt>rtiiwnt l NC' a.;; follows:
1

63-30-8. Wai?;cr of immunity for m.11try
crrnsPd by drfective, unsafe, or dan9errnts coudition of h(ql11ray.s, lJridges, or other
Irnmunity from snit of all governnwntal entities
is waived for any injury caused by a defective,
unsafe, or dangerous condition of any highway,

road, street, alley, crosswalk, sidewalk, culvert,
tunnel, bridge, viaduct or other structure located
thereon.
63-30-13. Claim against political subdivision
-Time for filing notice-Claim against city or
town for injitry on highways, bridges, or other
structures.-A claim against a political subdivision shall be forever barred unless notice thereof
is filed ·within ninety days after the cause of
action arises; provided, however, that any claim
filed against a city or incorporated town under
section 63-30-8 shall be governed by the provisions of section 10-7-77, Utah Code Annotated,
1938. (Emphasis added.)

Time for presenting - Contents Condition precedent to action. - Every claim,
against a city or incorporated town for darn.ages
or injury, alleged to have been caused by the
defective, unsafe, dangeroits or obstructed condition of any street, alley, crosswalk, sidewalk,
c11l1:ert or bridge of such city or town, or from
the negligence of the city or town authorities in
respect to any such street, alley, crosswalk, side1rnlk, culvert or bridge, shall within thirty days
after the happening of such injury or damage
l;e presented to the board of commisioners or
city coimcil of such city, or board of trustees of
such tow11, in writing, signed by the claimant or
by some person authorized to sign the same,
and properly verified, stating the particular time
at ,d1ich the injury happened, and designating
and dPserihing tht> particular place in which it
oecnrred, and also particularly describing the
cunse and circumstances of the injury or damages,
10-7-77.

G

and stating, if knffwn to claimant, the name of
the person, firm or corporation, who created,
brouglit abont or maintained the defect, obstrnction or condition causing such accident or injury,
and the nature and probable extent of such injury,
and the amount of damages claimed on account
of the same; such notice shall be sufficient in
the particulars above specified to enable the
offitPl'S of such city or town to find tlw place
and cause of such injury from the description
thereof given in the notice itself without extrant>ons inquiry, and no action shall be maintained
ar1a1'11st any city or town for damages or injury
tu person or property, unfoss it appears that the
claim, for which the action was brought was pres<' nted as aforesaid, and that such governing body
did not within ninety days thereafter audit and
allow the samf'. "' '" * (Emphasis added.)
10-7-78. Failure to file, a bar-Amendment
o( claim.-It shall be a sufficient bar and answer
any action or proceeding against a city or tmn1
in anv conrt for the collection of any claim mentioned in section 10-7-77, that such ciaim had not
lweu 1n·esented to the governing
of such
citv or town in the• manner and within tlw time
sp;•cified in section 10-7-77; provided, that in ('ase
an arC'onnt or claim, other than a claim made for
darna<res on acconnt of tlw unsafe, ckfective,
dangerous or obstrncted condition of any strPeL
all( _'1·, erosswalk, wa.'·, side\\'alk,
or bridge,
i : -: rt>qni red hy the governing body to be made
rnorP s1wcifir as to itemization or drscription,
or to lw properly verified, sufficient tiuw shalJ
lw allowed th<• ('laimant to comply with sn('h re(111irernent.
1
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These sections show a clear intent by the legislature
to permit the prosecution of injury claims caused by
a defective, unsafe or dangerous condition of any "highway, road, street," etc. only upon the presentation to
tlw city within 30 days of a verified claim in the form
prescribed. These sections all refer to areas upon and
adjarent to which people travel.
To say, as plaintiffs do, that their claim was not
hase<l upon Section 63-30-8 overlooks the fact that their
elaim, if they have one, must be based upon that section,
since the accident here involved an alleged unsafe, dangerous condition of the parking area (R. 1) which is a
part of the street. The quoted statutes, with regard to
sueh claims, make the thirty-day notice provisions of
Section 10-7-77 mandatorily applicable and not merely
optional as plaintiffs sPem to suggest.
1'hat the parking area is a part of the street is
solidl:v supported in the law. Thus 63 C.J.S. 104, Municizwl Corporations, Section 794a, provides:
"A sidewalk is usually regarded as part of
the street and a municipality is generally held
. the case of
liablt>, to ' the same extent as m
strePts."
''A strip locatt>d between the sidewalk proper
and the curb, variously denominated a parking
strip ... is generally regarded as a part of the

8

street which the municipality is bound to keqJ
in a rt'asonably safe condition." ( Ernphasi:-;
added.)
Also in 39 Am. Jur. 2d, Highu'ays, Streets, a11d
Bridges, Seetion 8, p. 408 it is stakd:
Generall:-·, tl1(• tenn "stred'' inclnd<'s sidewalks, and the sidl•walk constitutPs a part of
the street, although in no sens<>, it is said, ean
the term "side·walk" be held to include tlw strP<'t
proper. A "sidewalk" is a walk\\·ay along tlw
margin of a street or other highwa:-·, dPsignPd
and }ll"epared for the mw of pe(fostrians, to tl1('
exclusion of road vel1icles and horsemen. It may
embrace all that iiortion of a street from tl1('
building line to the curbing, including grassplais
or park strips lwtw<'Pll the walk proper and tJ1r·
cnrhing.
A ''cnrb" is tlw dividing line hetw(•011 tlw
part of the street or highway intended for Yt'hicular traffic and tl1e sidewalk, or part, internl<•d
for the nse of pedestrians, and it may,
to the law or facts involved, he considered
either a part of the stre1 t or higlivrn:-· or a part
of the sick-walk.
1

Tliat the frn11 "strvd" inelncl<>s all

cu1 lJ::.

roadways, parking, <•tc. Io ca tPd '"·it]ij n t1H· a n•n 1H'hn•('Jl
pri1·ate prop<•t:-' Jines and declicntf'cl to pnhlie n;.;v
indiC"atrd hy 8<'ction 41-Ci-7(n) an<l (h).

ahl

Cocl<-A111;u

tated, 1953 (ReplacemPnt Volume), regarding traffic
rnles and regulations, which defines a "street or high"'ay" and a "sidPwalk," respectively as:
"Street or Highway." The entire width between the boundary lines of every way publicly
nwintained when any part thereof is open to the
use of the public for purposes of vehicular travel.
"Side\valk." That portion of n street between
the curb lines, or the lateral lines of a roadway,
and the adjacent property lines intended for the
use of pedestrians. (Emphasis added.)
These definitions are consistent with the deposition
of Alton H. Sorensen and the exhibits attached thereto
which show the boundaries of Adams Street to extend
from the private property line on the west edge of the
street to the private property line on the east edge of
the street.
The case of Brown v. Salt Lake City, 33 Utah 222,
93 P. 570 (1908), relied upon by plaintiffs, supports the
rnl0 that the parking area is included within the meaning of the statute. In Brown the court was dealing with
a statnk identical in all material aspects to Section
10-7-77 of the present Utah Code.
Tlw court sta frd, with respect to the class of things
to which the statnte applied:
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"All these pertain to places and things which
the city is bound by law to maintain in a reasonably safe condition, and the statute makes them
liable for a neglect of duty with respect tlwreto."
93 P. at 573.
Streets, alleys, crosswalks, sidewalks, culverts, and
hridges are all things OH'r which people travel or
adjacPnt to areas peoplP travl'l upon. In Braim the
conrt properly Pxcluded from tlte class a large nndergronnd masonry water conduit 5-112 feet in diametPr.
Obviously such a conduit is not intended for use by
people in
nor is it physically a part of, or
immediately adjacent to such travel areas, as is the
parking strip.
In Jlorris i:. Salt Lakr City, 35 Utah 474, 101 P.
:373 ( 1909), the d(-'fl•ndant had been charged with liability
for damagP rPsnlting when trees on a parking strip
fell over. Tlw language of the court shows a clear
recognition that the parking ar<>a must be considered
part of the street:
"11 his is an action for damages . . . caused
through . . . cutting of the roots of . . . trees
standing and grrnri11g in a 1n17Jlic street in front
of his home."
"that in the street and betw('en the outer margin
of the "\Valk and the street JJroper there was an
irrigating diteh, upon the hank of which tlw tr0es
stood." (I•:mphasis added.)
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'rlie case of Liberman v. City of Akron, 80 Ohio L.
Abs. 170, 159 N.E. 2d 635 (1959), cited by plaintiffs
wa:-; deeidecl upon a rule of construction which conflicts
with the rule applicable in Utah. The court there, moreov<-r, \n•nt to considerable lengths to attempt to distinguish other Ohio Supreme Court cases which held to
th<> contrar.'', in deciding that the parking strip there
\\·as not included within the meaning of "street." The
Ohio Connty Court (not the Supreme Court) referred
·"lH'(•ificall.'· to and relied upon a rule of strict construction:
''This is a law in derogation of the common
law and must be strictly construed."
Tlw rPsnlt in LilJerman cannot obtain in Utah where
a sprcific code section provides, with respect to the
<·nnstruetion of statutes:
Statntes in derogation of common
lai1· liberallJJ constru.ed- Rules of eq1tity prevail.
_rrhe rule of the common law that statutes in
derogation thereof are to be strictly construed
has no application to the statutes of this state.
'l'lw :statutes establish the laws of t11is state respecting the subjects to which they relate, and
their provisions and all proceedings under them
to lw liberally construed with a view to effect
the objects of the statutes and to promote justice.
\Vhenever there is any variance between the rules
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of equity and the rules of common law in reference to the sanw matter the rules of equity shall
prevail.
rrhe case of Niblock V. Salt Lake City, 100 Utah
573, 111 P.2d 800 (1941), cited by plaintiffs is readily
distinguishable from the present case and actually tends
to support the lo-wer court's ruling. In that case the
court held, as would be expected, that an injury resulting from tlw negligent operation of a vehicle operated
one working on street repairs did not result from
defeds or dangProns conditions in the street.
Bri11kerlwff

'L

Salt Lake City, 13 Utah 2d 214, 371

P.2d 211 (19G2), cited in plaintiffs' brief does not hold
that a parking strip is to he excluded from the list
of conditions t:ipecified in Section 10-7-77.
did not reach this issue.

'fhe court

Rather, that decision tends

strongly to support the lower court ruling:
"r:11 his allegation \\'as proper under 'fitle 107-77, Utah Code Annotated 1953, having to do
with defoctive streets alleys, sidewalks, bridges
and the like."
The Brinherlwff case> uwrely holds, agarn as would lw
PXJlPclP<l, that tlw failnre to frncP a stream \Yas not a

<'Ornlition for which tlie citv could he liable under SPction
l0-7-77.

rl'he clrar majority of courts which have dealt with
tlw precise issnti have held that a parking strip is inC'lnded within the scope of a city's liability for its
'"streets." For example, in City of Holdenville v. Talley,
:203 Okla.
240 P.2d 761 (1952), the court held:

"It is the duty of a municipality to maintain
its streets and sidewalks in a reasonably safe
condition for public use and its duty in this respect as to its sidewalks is not confined within
the exact lines followed by the public in passing
over sidewalks but includes the duty to protect
the public from dangers near the sidewalks. City
of Muskogee v. Roberts, 193 Okl. 61, 141 P.2d
100; Oklahoma City v. Stewart, 155 Okl. 37, 8
P.2d 30.

"It is generally held that where a mumc1pality in laying out its streets sets aside a plot
of ground between the curb line and building
line as a parkway, the parkway constitutes a
part of the street. Village of Grosse Pointe
Shores v. Ayres, 254 Mich. 58, 235 N.W. 829;
Kleopfert v. City of Minneapolis, 90 l\finn. 158,
95 N:\V. 908; Castro v. Sutter Creek Union High
8chool Dist., 25 Cal. App. 2d 372, 77 P.2d 509.
"1,his Conrt in City of Tulsa v. Ensign, 189
Okl. 507, 117 P.2d 1013, 1015, said:
•It is common knowledge that in most of the
cities of this state the streets in the residential
districts are so laid out that there are grass plots
between the sidewalk and the building line, also
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between the sidewalk and the curb line, which
not infrequently contain trees, flowers or ornamental shrubs, and grass, which serve the purpose of making the street more attractive to those
who live upon it or pass through it.
'These areas so devoted to ornamentation
are still a part of the highway and the municipality must use a reasonable degree of care with
reference to their condition.' "
In Gilmore r. Kansas City, 157 Kan. 552, 142 P.2d 699
( 1943), tlw plaintiff had stepped into a hole in the
parking area left hy the removal of a power pole. On
appeal from a judgment for the plaintiff the city argued
that tl1e def Pct was not in a street or a sidewalk and
it was therefore not liahle.
The Kansas Supreme Court rejected that argument
and applied the same rule with respect to the parking
area as that applied to the street or sidewalk.
POINT II
THE

CLAIM

AGAINST

MIDVALE

CITY

WAS

PROPERLY DISMISSED FOR FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH UTAH CODE ANN. SECTION 10-7-77
(1953).

Plaintiffs argne that the trial court misapplied the
Gm·ernrnental Imrn11nity Act. The argument is based
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m an assertion that the claim is based on Section 10
of the act rather than Section 8.
Section 8 of the act waives immunity from suit for
injuries resulting from defective, unsafe, or dangerous
conditions of streets, etc. The language of this section
is strikingly similar to Section 10-7-77 of the Utah Code
Annotated.
Section 10 of the act waives imunity from suit for
injuries resulting from negligent acts or omissions of
employees committed within the scope of their employment provided the act or omission does not fall within
any of the eleven numerated exceptions.
Section 13 of the act requires all Section 8 claims
against cities to comply with the provisions of Section
10-7-77.
Plaintiffs argue that their claim is a Section 10
claim and therefore it was error to have dismissed this
defendant for failure to comply with Section 10-7-77.
If plaintiffs' claim is based on Section 10 as opposed
to Section 8 the record does not aid in this distinction.

Plaintiffs' argument appears to be that unless a
claimant elects to specify in his complaint that the action
is brought under Section 63-30-8, Section 10-7-77 can
have no bearing upon the matter. In other words they
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argue that a claimant may elect at his option which
section to bring his claim under.
No part of the Governmental Immunity Act requires
a pleading to state the section upon which the suit is
based. The section which governs a claim can only
be determined by the nature of the claim itself and the
circumstances which gave rise to the alleged injury.

It is clear from the act itself that the separate sec-

tions waiving immunity are set up in categories according to the nature of the defect or condition causing the
injury or the place where the injury occurred.

Once a person determines from the first part of
the act that he has a claim for which immunity has
been waived, it must then be determined from the latter
part the procedure which must be followed if the claim
is to be pursued. Section 63-30-13 sets forth the procedure for claims against cities on account of defective
conditions in the public ways and requires compliance
with the conditions set forth in Section 10-7-77.
Plaintiffs cannot escape the requirements of Section 10-7-77 if the nature of their claim falls within it
simply by stating that they elect to proceed under a
different, but inapplicable, statute. The section under
which plaintiffs' claim must be brought is not governed
by plaintiffs' own declarations, but by the nature of
the claim itself.
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Plaintiffs' attempt to distinguish Section 63-30-8
from 63-30-10 on the basis of whether or not the city
had notice of the defect giving rise to the injury does
not further their cause. Section 63-30-13 governs the
filing of all claims against cities. If the claim is in the
nature of claims provided for under Section 10-7-77,
that section must be complied with. Plaintiffs failed to
do this.

"It is a cardinal rule of statutory construc-

tion that all parts of the enactment should be
considered together so as to produce a harmonious
whole and to give effect to the intent and purpose to be divined from the entire act." Great
Salt Lake Authority v. Is.land Ranching Co., 18
Utah 2d 45, 414 P.2d 963 (1966).
The Governmental Immunity Act as a whole is
harmonious with the ruling of the lower court. By contrast the construction urged by plaintiffs requires an
assumption the legislature knew nothing about the scope
of Section 10-7-77. It would also require reading into
the statute distinctions which do not comport with the
express provisions contained therein.
CONCLUSION
The injuries sustained by the minor plaintiff were
allegedly caused by a defective, unsafe or dangerous
condition of the parking area which by definition and
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custom is a part of the street or highway ref erred to
in Sections 63-30-8, 10-7-77 and 10-7-78. Immunity of
the city from suit for such a claim having been waived
by the legislature upon specified procedural steps being
taken the plaintiffs may pursue their claim only upon
compliance with the procedure as outlined. The procedure to be followed is a prerequisite to recovery upon
the claim, it being neither optional with the plaintiff
nor with the court, but determinable solely from the
nature and the circumstances of the injury itself.
Having failed to comply with the procedure and
conditions set forth in the Governmental Immunity Act
the defendant, Midvale City, was entitled to a dismissal
as indicated in Section 10-7-78 and the lower court so
ruled. Its Summary Judgment should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
WORSLEY SNOW &
CHRISTENSEN
and Reed L. Martineau
Seventh Floor
Continental Bank Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Attorneys for DefendantRespondent

